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PROPERTY LAW—BEYOND REPAIR: THE PERSISTENT
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic1 exacerbated many precarities of American
life. Projections in July 2020 indicated that forty-three percent (43%) of
Arkansas’s renting households faced the possible inability to pay rent and,
consequently, eviction in the near future.2 While public debate on the necessity and feasibility of eviction moratoriums and rental assistance rages on,
one is left wondering: even in the best of times, is Arkansas’s eviction process balanced, efficient, and constitutional? Perhaps it takes the worst of
times to bring deserved scrutiny to one of the most glaring shortcomings in
Arkansas’s landlord-tenant laws.
Depending on where in Arkansas the rental property is located, landlords pursuing an eviction may have several processes from which to
choose. Three statutes provide judicial eviction procedures to eject tenants
and restore full possession to landlords.3 This Note disputes the constitutionality of one of these procedures: the failure to vacate statute.4

1. COVID-19, the contagious disease caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2,
was first reported in December 2019. The global pandemic has continued to the date of this
Note’s authorship. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, BASICS OF COVID19 (updated Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/aboutcovid-19/basics-covid-19.html.
2. Annie Nova, The Pandemic May Cause 40 Million Americans to Lose Their Homes,
CNBC (July 30, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/what-its-like-to-be-evictedduring-the-coivd-19-pandemic.html.
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (West 2020); id. § 18-60-301 (West 2020); id. § 1817-901 (West 2020).
4. For ease of reference, this Note refers to the eviction procedure codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 as the “failure to vacate statute.” Another one of Arkansas’s eviction
statutes has generated critical scholarship: the so-called “civil eviction” statute implemented
as part of Arkansas’s limited enactment of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act in 2007.
Professor Marshall Prettyman’s work on this statute’s shortcomings is instructive. See Marshall Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101 Et Seq., 2008
ARK. L. NOTES 71 (2008) (arguing the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, like the failure to
vacate statute, operated too much to the advantage of landlords); Marshall Prettyman, Landlord Protection Law Revisited: The Amendments to the Arkansas Residential LandlordTenant Act of 2007, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-17-101 Et. seq., 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
1031 (2013) (arguing that 2009 revisions to the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act were insufficient).
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In light of its severity and novelty, the failure to vacate statute has generated no shortage of local and national attention.5 The scholarship of Professors Lynn Foster and Carol Goforth aptly analyzed the constitutional deficiencies of the version in force between 2001 and 2017.6 However, the
failure to vacate statute has yet to undergo similar scrutiny following its
2017 revision.7
Section II of this Note provides an overview of the historical development of judicial and nonjudicial eviction procedures, from the self-help regime of feudalism to the current debate regarding Arkansas’s unique failure
to vacate statute.8 Section III recounts the key legal challenges against the
failure to vacate statute and traces the history of its amendments by the General Assembly.9 Section IV discusses the failure to vacate statute’s design
and actual effects.10 Section V illustrates the constitutional deficiencies of
the statute on three key grounds: (1) cruel and unusual punishment, (2) due
process, and (3) preeminence of property rights.11 Section VI concludes this
Note by making the case that, in light of its persistent deficiencies both in
theory and in practice, the failure to vacate statute ought to be repealed.12
II.

FROM FEUDALISM TO FAILURE TO VACATE

The practice of landowners temporarily renting out the right to occupy
their property stretches back beyond well-recorded history.13 Relatively
5. See Maya Miller & Ellis Simani, When Falling Behind on Rent Leads to Jail Time,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2020, 11:30 AM EDT) [hereinafter Falling Behind on Rent],
https://www.propublica.org/article/when-falling-behind-on-rent-leads-to-jail-time;
CHRIS
ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PAY THE RENT OR FACE ARREST: ABUSIVE IMPACTS
OF ARKANSAS’S DRACONIAN EVICTIONS LAW (Arvind Ganesan et al. eds., 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0113arkansas_reportcover_web.pdf.
6. See Lynn Foster, The Hands of the State: The Failure to Vacate Statute and Residential Tenants’ Rights in Arkansas, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing the
history, inconsistent enforcement, and practical and constitutional issues posed by the failure
to vacate statute’s amended form); Carol R. Goforth, Arkansas Code § 18-16-101: A Challenge to the Constitutionality and Desirability of Arkansas’ Criminal Eviction Statute, 2003
ARK. L. NOTES 21 (2003).
7. The statute has, however, been examined from the perspective of penal philosophy.
See Bryan Foster, The Purpose of Criminal Evictions: Applying the Theories of Punishment
to Arkansas’ Criminal Eviction Statute, 2018 ARK. L. NOTES 1993 (2018).
8. See infra Section II.
9. See infra Section III.
10. See infra Section IV.
11. See infra Section V.
12. See infra Section VI.
13. The Code of Hammurabi, among human civilization’s earliest forms of written law,
contains a provision on the “payment of rent” for agricultural property. See David G. Lyon,
The Structure of the Hammurabi Code, 25 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 248, 256 (1904); see also
Luke 20:9 (the “Parable of the Tenants”).
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speaking, the law governing the removal of breaching tenants is considerably younger.14 This Section cursorily traces the history of eviction procedures from feudal self-help to the American tradition of summary eviction
and Arkansas’s partial departure from that tradition in 1901.
A.

Self-Help Eviction

For much of English history, the social hierarchy pervading the feudal
system colored the landlord-tenant relationship—as the term “landlord”
suggests.15 That social hierarchy informed the legal view of the tenant as a
“servant to the landlord”16 and in the landlord’s ability to remove tenants
through any means, including extrajudicial violence.17 Though the English
government eventually introduced limitations and alternatives in an effort to
discourage outright violence, forceful self-help evictions persisted.18
In the early United States, most jurisdictions permitted self-help evic19
tion. Though the majority of states,20 including Arkansas,21 have since prohibited self-help eviction through either legislative act or judicial decision,
the old habit persists even where it is no longer welcome.22

14. See, e.g., Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction
Process A Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV.
759, 773 (1994).
15. See generally Tom G. Geurts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real Estate, 32 REAL EST. L.J. 356 (2004) (providing an overview of the residential
leasehold in the common law, from the Middle Ages to the Uniform Residential Landlord
Tenant Act).
16. Id. at 356.
17. Gerchick, supra note 14, at 773–74.
18. Id. at 774–75.
19. Id. at 776.
20. Id. at 777–78.
21. See Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 337, 712 S.W.2d 888, 890 (1986) (forbidding
self-help evictions).
22. In 2020, a Conway, Arkansas, tenant complained that his landlord attempted to
covertly move his property into storage in order to effectuate a self-help eviction. See Marine
Glisovic, Conway Landlord Accused of ‘Self-Help Eviction’ Caught Removing Tenant’s
Belongings, KATV (May 20, 2020), https://katv.com/news/local/conway-landlord-accusedof-self-help-eviction-caught-removing-tenants-belongings; David Ramsey & Benjamin Hardy, No Shelter in Place: Conway Renter Says Landlord Tried to Illegally Force Him Out of
His Home, ARK. TIMES (May 19, 2020, 9:58 PM), https://arktimes.com/arkansasblog/2020/05/19/no-shelter-in-place-conway-renter-says-landlord-tried-to-illegally-forcehim-out-of-his-home.
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Ejectment

The states, like the English monarchy before them, sought to discourage violent self-help evictions through a more structured legal process.23
However, the first proffered alternative, ejectment, proved unattractive.24
Through ejectment, the landlord was required to demonstrate superior title
to the rental property.25 However, ejectment required that the landlord prove
their claim superior not only to the tenant’s, but to all others as well.26
Ejectment entailed complex legal actions with long delays; therefore, some
landlords preferred the simpler and more direct option of self-help.27
C.

Summary Eviction

As states sought a process that avoided the irregularity of self-help and
the inefficiency of ejectment, forcible entry and detainer statutes emerged. 28
These statutes aimed to provide landlords with speedy recourse in civil court
while also affording defenses and remedies for unlawfully dispossessed tenants.29 The process, sometimes called summary eviction, attempted to strike
a balance between expeditiousness for the landlord and due process for the
tenant.30 Summary eviction proved to be a relative success, as all states enacted versions of this approach.31 Arkansas was no exception and enacted its
unlawful detainer statute in 1875.32
D.

Failure to Vacate

Despite joining the majority trend regarding summary eviction and,
eventually, self-help evictions,33 Arkansas blazed its own trail by enacting a
criminal eviction process in 1901.34 The proposal was controversial and divisive in Arkansas’s General Assembly, as it provoked a spirited debate

23. Gerchick, supra note 14, at 776.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Robert F. Fitzpatrick, Jr., The Development of Massachusetts Law Governing the
Disposition of Evicted Tenants’ Property, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1991).
28. Gerchick, supra note 14, at 776.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 777.
31. Id.
32. Foster, supra note 6, at 2; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-301 (West 2020).
33. Arkansas’s prohibition of self-help eviction came over a century after its enactment
of a summary eviction statute. Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 338, 712 S.W.2d 888, 891
(1986).
34. Foster, supra note 6, at 6–7.

2022]

THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE

383

before passing the Senate by only one vote.35 The Senate’s floor debate,
reproduced in the Arkansas Gazette, demonstrates the key concerns of the
failure to vacate statute’s first proponents and critics:36
Senator King (Jacob) spoke in favor of the bill. He said it simply sought
to give relief to landlords who were unable to eject tenants who would
not pay their rent.
Senator Dowdy opposed the bill. He said it was entirely one-sided. In his
judgment, all in favor of the landlord, and amounted to nothing more nor
less than to give the landlord the right to throw his tenant in jail if he
failed to pay the rent. He was opposed to criminal measures for settling
matters already covered by civil statutes. . . .
Senator Lawrence also opposed the bill. He said it was simple class legislation in favor of the landlord, no more, no less, and ought to be defeated.
Senator Jacob King--The bill only provides for a fine and nothing is said
about putting anybody in jail.
Senator Lawrence--That is true, but we all know what is done to a poor
man in this state who cannot pay his fine. He is sent to jail and compelled to work it out.
Senator Kirby also opposed the bill. He thought the county was coming
to a great pass when a man could be arrested and put in jail for debt. He
could not see that the bill amounted to anything else. . . .
Senator Jacob King closed the debate. He said the act was needed in the
country as well as in the towns. It was intended to compel men to come
up to their contracts and prevent dishonesty along that line. 37

As the reproduced floor debate illustrates, the senators drew stark battle
lines on the proposed failure to vacate statute, prioritizing landowner rights
on one side and balking at the potential consequences of criminalizing nonpayment of rent on the other side.38 This is specifically demonstrated by
Senator King’s initial defense of the Act insisting that it simply provided
landlords with an additional tool to remove non-paying tenants, and Senator
Lawrence’s concern that indebted tenants would be “sent to jail and com-

35. Id.; see also South Carolina Dispensary Law - Similar Bill Introduced in the House;
Thirty-Four New Bills In, ARK. GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 1901, at 3.
36. South Carolina Dispensary Law - Similar Bill Introduced in the House; Thirty-Four
New Bills In, supra note 35, at 3.
37. Id.
38. See id.
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pelled to work [their fines] out.”39 Senator Lawrence was likely referring to
the practice of convict leasing.40 Even with the concerns of convict leasing
and jail time for indebtedness expressed, the bill passed the Senate fourteen
to thirteen.41
Though the unusual42 and maligned43 failure to vacate statute remains
in effect today, the statute’s path through the last century was marked by
frequent challenges in court and two overhauls.
III.

LITIGATING, AMENDING, AND RESTORING THE FAILURE TO VACATE
STATUTE

The Supreme Court of Arkansas first considered the criminal eviction
statute’s constitutionality when it issued its short opinion in Poole v. State.44
Patricia Poole faced conviction and fines under the criminal eviction statute.45 In her appeal to the court Poole argued the criminal eviction statute
ought to be declared facially unconstitutional as an unreasonable exercise of
the State’s police power.46 Poole asserted that residential evictions were beyond “the scope of the public health, safety[,] and general welfare and interest.”47
The court disagreed. First, it deferred to the General Assembly, noting
that the criminal eviction statute had been in effect since 1901.48 The court
treated the statute’s longevity as evidence of constitutionality.49 The court
held that the criminal eviction statute is a valid exercise of police power
primarily because “public health, safety[,] and welfare is always threatened
when a person wrongfully trespasses upon another person’s property in Arkansas.”50 According to the court, the criminal eviction statute punishes only
39. Id.
40. The convict leasing system was an economic arrangement throughout the Reconstruction South wherein cash-strapped state governments leased convicts to private interests
as cheap labor. Like other Jim Crow institutions, convict leasing sported highly racialized
implementation and dragged one aspect of the social and economic regime of chattel slavery
into the twentieth century. See Calvin R. Ledbetter, Jr., The Long Struggle to End Convict
Leasing in Arkansas, 52 ARK. HIST. Q. 1, 2 (1993).
41. South Carolina Dispensary Law - Similar Bill Introduced in the House; Thirty-Four
New Bills In, supra note 35, at 3.
42. See Foster, supra note 6, at 8 (commenting on a repealed 1933 Florida statute that
criminalized holding over after the end of a lease’s term).
43. See generally ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 5.
44. 244 Ark. 1222, 428 S.W.2d 628 (1968).
45. Id. at 1223–24, 428 S.W.2d at 629.
46. Id., 428 S.W.2d at 629.
47. Id. at 1224, 428 S.W.2d at 629.
48. Id. at 1225, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
49. Id., 428 S.W.2d at 630.
50. Poole, 244 Ark. at 1225, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
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one, the “one who has become a trespasser,” and his or her refusal to vacate
exhibits criminal intent to infringe on the landlord’s property interest.51 The
court held that failing to vacate after withholding rent constitutes trespass
and “[n]o one can seriously argue that wrongful trespass does not come
within the police power of the state.”52
The failure to vacate statute underwent its next round of constitutional
scrutiny in federal court, coalescing in the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Munson v. Gilliam.53 In their suit against a state prosecutor, Gilliam and four coplaintiffs alleged that failure to vacate charges were being brought “arbitrarily . . . to assist landlords in evicting tenants who fail to pay rent” rather
than law enforcement purposes.54 Gilliam argued the failure to vacate statute
unduly circumvented Arkansas’s civil eviction procedures because it, “puts
a ‘chilling effect’ on the tenant’s right to assert defenses, and forces the tenant to risk criminal conviction and fine as a result of what he may have considered to be a justified refusal to pay rent.”55
While the Eighth Circuit decided the case primarily on procedural
grounds, it briefly cited the Poole holding with some approval.56 While not
expressly siding one way or the other, the Eighth Circuit held that the Poole
court’s characterization of breaching tenants as trespassers is “a conclusion
available to a state under the Constitution.”57
The Supreme Court of Arkansas revisited the failure to vacate statute in
Duhon v. State.58 Brigiette Duhon was convicted under the criminal eviction
statute and sentenced to a striking $1,625.00 fine.59 Like Poole, Duhon challenged the failure to vacate statute’s constitutionality on two relevant
grounds: (1) “it denies her due process of law under the authority of Matthews v. Eldridge,” and (2) “it does not bear a substantial relationship to an
end which promotes the public health, safety[,] or welfare.”60 Duhon pointed
to the Supreme Court of the United States case Greene v. Lindsey61 and Arkansas’s self-help eviction case, Gorman v. Ratliff, to demonstrate that

51. Id. at 1226, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
52. Id. at 1226, 428 S.W.2d at 630–31.
53. 543 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1976).
54. Id. at 50.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 53.
57. Id.
58. 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989).
59. Id. at 506, 774 S.W.2d at 833.
60. Id. at 508, 774 S.W.2d at 834.
61. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1982) (“In this case, appellees have been
deprived of a significant interest in property: indeed, of the right to continued residence in
their homes.”).
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“property rights of a tenant have changed” such that “Poole . . . should be
overturned.”62
On Duhon’s police power argument, the court simply stated that “we
do not . . . feel [Greene and Gorman] overcome the presumption of constitutionality.”63 Poole’s holding that the criminal eviction statute was a valid
exercise of police power survived (albeit for reasons that the Duhon court
failed to clearly explain).64
Justice Purtle authored a spirited dissent to the majority’s holding in
Duhon.65 Purtle insisted that, in light of Gorman, the failure to vacate statute’s constitutionality was “ripe for adjudication.”66 Purtle argued that Gorman and Greene both warranted the recognition that a tenant’s interest in
continued possession warrants additional protection during the eviction process.67 Purtle lamented that Gorman’s one step forward was countered by
Duhon’s two steps backward, remarking that “[t]he majority has, with all the
speed of a crawfish, backed into the 19th century.”68
In 2001, the General Assembly amended the failure to vacate statute by
adding a requirement that tenants pay the disputed rent into the court’s registry in order to present a defense, as well as escalating the penalty for those
found guilty.69 After the statute was amended, the failure to vacate statute’s
opponents scored their first victory in State v. Smith.70 Artoria Smith challenged her conviction for failure to vacate under both the United States and
Arkansas Constitutions, arguing that the statute violated equal protection
and due process, chilled the tenant-defendant’s right to trial, resulted in imprisonment for debt, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.71 At
trial, even the State expressed uncertainty regarding the statute’s constitutionality in light of the new registry requirement’s potential to “expose a
defendant to different levels of punishment based on the defendant’s ability
to pay into the district court registry.”72
62. Duhon, 299 Ark. at 510, 774 S.W.2d at 835.
63. Id., 774 S.W.2d at 835.
64. Id. at 511, 774 S.W.2d at 836.
65. Id. at 512–13, 774 S.W.2d at 836–37 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 512, 774 S.W.2d at 836 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 512–13, 774 S.W.2d at 836–37 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
68. Duhon, 299 Ark. at 512, 774 S.W.2d at 836. Colorful language in a dissent was not
out of the ordinary for Justice Purtle. For more on his life and jurisprudence, see Samuel A.
Perroni, Setting the Record Straight on State v. John Ingram Purtle: Reflections on the Great
Dissenter, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 135 (2011).
69. See Foster, supra note 6, at 11–12, 16.
70. No. CR 2014-2707, 2015 WL 991180, at *7 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2015), superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 13, 2017, No. 159, 2017 Ark. Acts 159 (S.B. 25) (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (West 2020)).
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id.
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The court found that the 2001 version of the criminal eviction statute
violated due process, chilled the defendant’s right to trial, was not narrowly
tailored to advance the landlord’s property rights, and potentially implicated
prohibitions against the criminalization of debt.73 The court was uncertain
whether the punishment imposed by the criminal eviction statute was cruel,
but found the law was sui generis and so “by definition—an ‘unusual’ punishment.”74
After the Smith court found the failure to vacate statute’s 2001 form
unconstitutional,75 the General Assembly reverted the statute back to its
original form.76 After a brief departure from 2001 to 2017, the statute has
returned to where it started, reviving the century-old debate between Senators King and Lawrence.77 The failure to vacate statute currently reads as
follows:
(a) Any person who shall rent any dwelling house or other building or
any land situated in the State of Arkansas and who shall refuse or fail to
pay the rent therefor when due according to contract shall at once forfeit
all right to longer occupy the dwelling house or other building or land.
(b)(1) If, after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given by
the landlord or the landlord’s agent or attorney to the tenant to vacate the
dwelling house or other building or land, the tenant shall willfully refuse
to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises to the landlord or
the landlord’s agent or attorney, the tenant shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2)(A) Upon conviction before any justice of the peace or other court of
competent jurisdiction in the county where the premises are situated, the
tenant shall be fined in any sum not less than one dollar ($1.00) nor more
than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each offense.

73. Id. at *2–7.
74. Id. at *7.
75. Professors Foster and Goforth ably analyzed the more extreme 2001–2017 version’s
many deficiencies. See supra text accompanying note 6.
76. The 2017 amendment justified the criminal eviction statute’s survival, despite the
State v. Smith decision, by stating, “It is in the best interests of the people of the State of
Arkansas for property owners to continue to have remedies against tenants who fail to pay for
a dwelling house or other building but refuse to surrender possession . . . .” See Act of Feb.
13, 2017, No. 159, sec. 1, 2017 Ark. Acts 159 (S.B. 25) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 1816-101 (West 2020)).
77. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(West 2020) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16101 (Repl. 2003).
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(B) Each day the tenant shall willfully and unnecessarily hold the dwelling house or other building or land after the expiration of notice to vacate
shall constitute a separate offense. 78

IV.

ARKANSAS’S FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE IN THEORY AND IN
PRACTICE

If the property is in a municipality where the failure to vacate statute is
enforced, the landlord may invoke the State’s power and seek a criminal
proceeding against the non-paying tenant. This option is more limited in
scope than the State’s unlawful detainer statute, as the tenant is only guilty
of failure to vacate if he or she does not leave the rental property after ten
days’ notice of her alleged delinquency on rent.79 There is no minimum
amount in controversy; therefore, a landlord could allege that he or she is
the victim of a tenant’s failure to vacate the property even if the tenant falls
only one dollar short or one day behind on rent.
At first glance, the landlord’s initiating the process by serving the tenant with a notice to vacate for the tenant’s alleged nonpayment of rent appears to be the statute’s initial effect.80 However, one should note that the
statute also provides that the tenant “forfeit[s]” his or her right to occupy the
premises when rent is first owed.81 Should the tenant fail to comply with the
landlord’s notice to vacate within ten days, the statute provides that he or
she “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”82 If then convicted, the tenant faces
a fine of one to twenty-five dollars per day that the tenant held over after the
notice to vacate expired.83
The failure to vacate statute is messy and irregular in practice. To start,
it is enforced inconsistently, as the district courts of most counties and even
some local prosecutors simply do not follow it.84 Once the landlord presses
charges, those prosecutors who do enforce the statute rarely investigate the
individual claims, instead taking the landlord’s affidavit for granted.85 The

78. Id. § 18-16-101.
79. Id. § 18-16-101(b)(1).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 18-16-101(a).
82. Id. § 18-16-101(b)(1).
83. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(b)(2).
84. Foster, supra note 6, at 10–11; Falling Behind on Rent, supra note 5; see also Maya
Miller & Ellis Simani, A Deputy Prosecutor Was Fired for Speaking Out Against Jail Time
for People Who Fall Behind on Rent, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 27, 2020, 6:00 AM EST),
https://www.propublica.org/article/a-state-prosecutor-was-fired-for-speaking-out-against-jailtime-for-people-who-fall-behind-on-rent.
85. “The landlord files an affidavit to initiate the process. Prosecutors typically do not
investigate landlords’ claims, and thus it is possible for landlords to make false representations, simply to evict the tenant, even though to do so would be a crime.” NON-LEGISLATIVE
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statute’s consequences are unpredictable and often harsh, as tenants may
face arrest warrants and even jail sentences for failing to appear at their
hearings.86 Those with no experience in the criminal process or advance
knowledge of the obscure statute may be shocked to see that seemingly pedestrian rent disputes beget warrants and criminal records.87
The reality Arkansas tenants face demonstrates that the consequences
of the current failure to vacate statute are not so different from those held to
be unconstitutional by State v. Smith. While imprisonment and flat fines are
no longer facial punishments under the failure to vacate statute, evictions
nevertheless “snowball from charges to warrants to arrests to jail time.”88
Arrests for mere failure to vacate persist.89 Regardless of whether the General Assembly anticipated this outcome, the failure to vacate statute operates
today in much the same way as the 2001–2017 form.
V.

THE CASE AGAINST THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE

The failure to vacate statute is vulnerable to a constitutional challenge
from numerous angles. This Section demonstrates the statute’s unconstitutionality on three grounds. First, the statute is facially unusual and prescribes
a disproportionate punishment.90 Second, the statute undermines the tenant’s
due process rights and overreaches the State’s police power because it mischaracterizes occupying a rental property after a breach as a trespass.91
Third, the statute’s lack of regard for the tenant’s interest in rental property
runs afoul of the Arkansas Constitution’s emphasis on property rights.92
A.

The Failure to Vacate Statute Imposes Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.93 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that statutory punishments are unconstitutional if they are “barbarous or unknown to the law, or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the com-

COMMISSION ON THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS 758 (U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
ed., 2013).
86. Falling Behind on Rent, supra note 5.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See infra Section V.A.
91. See infra Section V.B.
92. See infra Section V.C.
93. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
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munity.”94 Proportionality is a fluid consideration based on “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”95
Proponents of the failure to vacate statute might argue that the General
Assembly rescued the statute’s constitutionality when it reverted the statute
to its pre-2001 form. Indeed, Smith v. State afforded the statute’s original
form the dubious praise of being the “less draconian” of the two versions. 96
However, the failure to vacate statute remains unconstitutional because it
prescribes a demonstrably unusual punishment. The two key reasons for
this, which the restoration of the statute’s original form did not remedy, are
the failure to vacate statute’s novelty and the disproportionality of the punishment contained within its first provision.
1.

Prosecuting Landlord-Tenant Disputes is a Criminal Practice
Unknown to Law

When the General Assembly struck the amendments to the failure to
vacate statute’s penalties, it could not remedy the statute’s most unusual
feature: its existence. At that time, and today, Arkansas stands alone in its
criminalization of nonpayment of rent.97 The Smith court held “[t]he fact that
Arkansas remains alone here counsels in favor of the failure to vacate statute
being a cruel and unusual punishment[,]”98 and this remains the case regardless of the statute’s exact terms. The General Assembly can revise the statute’s wording in an attempt to alleviate its most glaring defects, but the
General Assembly cannot force other jurisdictions to join Arkansas in criminalizing failure to vacate, nor can the General Assembly force the federal
government to permit the application of the statute to HUD-backed housing.
There is simply no remedy to the failure to vacate statute’s exceptionality.
Therefore, the failure to vacate statute’s punishment is “by definition” unusual, the very sort which should be considered unknown to law.99
Another Arkansas law ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment in Jackson
v. Bishop, where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that striking prisoners with a strap was cruel and unusual punishment.100 The Court held the
practice was cruel and unusual, in part because, “Public opinion is obviously
adverse. Counsel concede [sic] that only two states still permit the use of the
94. Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 846, 440 S.W.2d 244, 249 (1969).
95. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
96. State v. Smith, No. CR 2014-2707, 2015 WL 991180, at *6 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20,
2015), superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 13, 2017, No. 159, 2017 Ark. Acts 159 (S.B. 25)
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (West 2020)).
97. Id. at *6; Falling Behind on Rent, supra note 5.
98. Smith, 2015 WL 991180, at *6.
99. Id. at *7.
100. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968).
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strap. Thus almost uniformly has it been abolished. It has been expressly
outlawed by statute in a number of states.”101
Arkansas stands alone in prosecuting landlord-tenant disputes; therefore, Jackson’s reasoning would indicate that the failure to vacate statute
should go the way of the strap. Arkansas prisons are not so uniquely unruly
as to necessitate a mode of punishment that went extinct in virtually every
other state. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the General Assembly could
demonstrate that Arkansas’s tenants are so prone to occupying rental properties after a breach that the failure to vacate statute’s novelty is sensible.
2.

The Failure to Vacate Statute Imposes Punishments Wholly Disproportionate to the Nonpayment of Rent

The failure to vacate statute’s uniqueness, as described in the preceding
Section, makes it somewhat difficult to analyze its proportionality under the
usual factors provided by the Supreme Court of the United States.102 However, this want for a point of comparison does not foreclose on proportionality analysis, because the clear trend against the statute’s use demonstrates
that its operation shocks “the moral sense of the community.” 103 The failure
to vacate statute faces ongoing challenges from lawmakers, activists, scholars, and even some prosecutors.104 Counties and district courts remain split
on whether to enforce the statute and, if so, which of its provisions to actually enforce.105 The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development prohibits federally-backed housing authorities and Section 8 landlords from using the failure to vacate statute, limiting evictions only to “judicial action[s].”106 The failure to vacate statute’s notoriety and inconsistent
use throughout Arkansas demonstrates what seems intuitive: criminal prosecution is a response disproportionate to a tenant’s remaining in his or her
home after falling one day behind on rent.

101. Id.
102. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (“[P]roportionality analysis under the
Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminal in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”).
103. Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 846, 440 S.W.2d 244, 249 (1969).
104. Falling Behind on Rent, supra note 5; Miller & Simani, supra note 84.
105. See NON-LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS,
supra note 85, at 760.
106. See 24 C.F.R. § 247.6 (2021); see also Foster, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development “opined that the failure to vacate statute was
not ‘judicial action for eviction’”).
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The Failure to Vacate Statute Violates the Tenant’s Due Process Rights
and Overreaches the State’s Police Power

This Section scrutinizes how the failure to vacate statute affects individual renters’ relationships with the State. The statute implicates due process concerns by purporting to extinguish a tenant’s interest in his or her
rental property without prior hearing107 and overreaches the State’s police
power because the Supreme Court of Arkansas’s attempt to analogize failure
to vacate with trespassing lacks reason or supporting authority. 108
1.

The Failure to Vacate Statute Deprives Tenants of a Possessory
Property Interest Without Prior Hearing

Where property rights are at issue, due process requires “at a minimum,
that one be given a meaningful opportunity for a hearing . . . .”109 Determining what exactly constitutes a meaningful opportunity is a case-sensitive
question.110 However, when it comes to the failure to vacate statute’s forfeiture provision,111 it is clear that a tenant is afforded no such opportunity.
The statute purports to extinguish the tenant’s possessory interest in the
property if the tenant fails to pay rent “when due.”112 Though the statute
specifies “due according to the contract,” it fails to define “due,” leaving a
question as to whether tenants’ rights are forfeited when rent is past-due or
actually late.113 Regardless, the forfeiture described in this provision appears
to occur automatically, preliminary to the rest of the statute. The statute contemplates no hearing or other proceeding to determine the fate of the tenant’s property interest; rather, that interest seemingly perishes by operation
of law when the statute allows the landlord to file the notice to vacate.

107. See infra Section V.B.1.
108. See infra Section V.B.2.
109. Davis v. Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 1207, 482 S.W.2d 785, 789 (1972).
110. See id., 482 S.W.2d at 789.
111. The provision states:
Any person who shall rent any dwelling house or other building or any land situated in the State of Arkansas and who shall refuse or fail to pay the rent therefor
when due according to contract shall at once forfeit all right to longer occupy the
dwelling house or other building or land.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(a) (West 2020).
112. Id.
113. Id. Residential leases commonly provide a “grace period” during which rent is technically due but the landlord covenants not to take adverse action for a period of days. See
Marcia Stewart, Grace Periods and Rent Due Dates, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/free-books/renters-rights-book/chapter3-4.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
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The Failure to Vacate Statute is an Inappropriate Exercise of the
State’s Police Power

In the debate regarding the failure to vacate statute’s constitutionality,
all roads lead to Poole v. State’s holding that the statute is a valid exercise of
the State’s police power. Duhon v. State and Munson v. Gilliam both cited
Poole with approval on questions of police power and public interest; therefore, Poole is a lynchpin for the failure to vacate statute’s legitimacy. 114
The Poole court rested its defense of the failure to vacate statute on two
principal points. First, the court noted, “[t]he right of an individual to acquire and possess and protect property is inherent and inalienable and declared higher than any constitutional sanction in Arkansas.”115 Second, “the
public health, safety[,] and welfare is always threatened when a person
wrongfully trespasses upon another person’s property in Arkansas.”116
As the following Sections demonstrate, the Poole court’s characterization of breaching tenants as trespassers is hasty and unsupported by prior or
even subsequent precedent. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that evictions
are a matter of public health, safety, or welfare, the statute fails to adequately address those concerns.
a.

The breach of a residential lease is not a criminal trespass

According to the Poole court, “no one can seriously argue that wrongful trespass does not come within the police power of the state” and trespass
poses an enlarged threat to public health, safety, and welfare “when the trespasser persists in the trespass and defies the owner’s right to possession.” 117
The court seemed to take for granted, however, that a tenant immediately
becomes a trespasser by breaching a lease.
The court couched its conflation of breach and trespass in a limited
reading of the failure to vacate statute. The court claimed the statute regulates trespassers because it “relates only to one who ‘shall refuse or fail to
pay the rent therefor, when due, according to contract’ and after ten days
[sic] notice to vacate, ‘shall wilfully [sic] refuse’ to do so.”118 This seems to
misunderstand the true extent of the statute’s effect. The statute, by its very
first provision, does not merely punish those who refuse to vacate after notice. The statute’s first provision terminates, through the operation of law,
114. See Poole v. State, 244 Ark. 1222, 1226, 428 S.W.2d 628, 631 (1968); Duhon v.
State, 299 Ark. 503, 510, 774 S.W.2d 830, 835 (1985); see also Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d
48, 53 (8th Cir. 1976).
115. Poole, 244 Ark. at 1225, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
116. Id., 428 S.W.2d at 630.
117. Id. at 1225–26, 428 S.W.2d at 630–31.
118. Id. at 1226, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
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the tenant’s property interest at the moment rent is due and unpaid.119 Therefore, despite the court’s suggestion that the statute concerns only those who
refuse to pay rent and defy notice for over a week, the reality is starker. The
statute only proscribes trespass if falling one day short on rent is properly
construed as a trespass.
The Poole court cites no authority to support its characterization of
breaching tenants as trespassers. What could seem, at first glance, like an
elegant way to pull evictions into the scope of police power further unravels
in light of subsequent case law. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held
that the criminal trespass statute does not apply in residential landlord-tenant
disputes.120 Furthermore, the “criminal trespass statute [requires] an illegal
entry” and the General Assembly has “historically treated the two types of
illegal occupancy [criminal trespass and holdover tenancy] in different
ways.”121 When the Poole court held that criminalizing nonpayment of rent
was a valid exercise of police power, it apparently embraced the following
contradiction: by breaching a lease, the tenant has committed a trespass sufficiently severe to permit criminalization but not sufficiently severe to actually meet the statutory definition of criminal trespass.
Neither common law nor the Supreme Court of Arkansas’s jurisprudence provides solid support for the Poole court’s analogy of breach to trespass. Therefore, the court’s conclusion that the failure to vacate statute is a
valid exercise of police power rests on, at best, a shaky assumption.
b.

If it is a valid exercise of police power, the failure to vacate
statute is both overbroad and underinclusive

Though the preceding subsection argued that the criminalization of
non-payment of rent is not a valid exercise of police power, this subsection
grants that premise for the sake of argument. This subsection asks whether,
in the Poole court’s formulation of the applicable level of scrutiny, the failure to vacate statute “bears a real and substantial relationship” to the end of
safeguarding society from tenants’ so-called “trespassing.”122
If breaching tenants are, as the Poole court says, essentially trespassing, then the failure to vacate statute seems woefully underinclusive. After
all, there are many ways one can breach a residential lease. The failure to
vacate statute purports, therefore, to protect society from the threat to public
welfare posed by nonpayment of rent. This leaves the public unguarded
from the surely equivalent or greater threats posed by unpermitted sublet119.
120.
(1985).
121.
122.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(a) (West 2020).
See Williams v. City of Pine Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 555, 683 S.W.2d 923, 925–26
Id., 683 S.W.2d at 925.
Poole, 244 Ark. at 1226, 428 S.W.2d at 631.
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ting, abandonment, early termination, and unauthorized pets.123 The purpose
of this irrational specificity remains a mystery.
However, the failure to vacate statute is also overbroad because it prohibits and punishes all nonpayment of rent, regardless of the amount owed
or tardiness. Does terminating a tenant’s property interest for becoming one
day delinquent on rent have any relation whatsoever to the State’s goal of
preventing trespassing? This absurd overreach follows from the statute’s
treatment of all degrees of nonpayment as equally undesirable, and yet, as
discussed above, the statute inexplicably singles out only one category of
breach for criminalization.
C.

The Failure to Vacate Statute Undermines Property Rights

Article II of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas provides that
“[t]he right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction.”124 While this provision refers principally to takings and compensation,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas echoed this language in Poole v. State.125
Despite the reverence for individual property rights apparent from Arkansas’s Constitution and jurisprudence, cases on the failure to vacate statute seem to ignore the tenant’s possessory interest126 in his or her rental
property. If the tenant’s interest is, like all property rights in Arkansas,
“higher than any constitutional sanction,”127 it should not be so unceremoniously dissolved by the operation of a mere statute.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Arkansas has yet to decide whether it will be a jurisdiction “where the
weak and the strong stand on equal terms.”128 The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Poole v. State, wrote with spirit on the supposed preeminence of in-

123. The author’s own residential lease served as the inspiration for this parade of horribles.
124. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22.
125. Poole, 244 Ark. at 1225, 428 S.W.2d at 630.
126. Geurts states:
Under the traditional common law view this is considered to be a conveyance.
However, over time the tenant was seen more and more as a separate owner of an
estate in land and thus it was recognized by common law courts that the landlord
conveyed a bigger bundle of property rights, in particular the right to exclusive
possession, to the tenant.
Geurts, supra note 15.
127. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22.
128. Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 337, 712 S.W. 2d 888, 890 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
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dividual property rights.129 Nevertheless, in apparent contradiction of this
ideal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas continues to prop up an eviction statute that fails to acknowledge the property interests of those on the other side
of eviction hearings. In increasingly dire times for the state, as both sides of
the eviction process face an uncertain future, the wisdom and necessity of
repeal become all the more apparent. Persistent inconsistency and undesirable outcomes, despite revision and reversion, have proven that Arkansas’s
failure to vacate statute is broken beyond repair.
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